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ABSTRACT 
 
The Distributional Effects of Consumption Taxes in New Zealand 
 
 
This paper investigates the distributional effects of the GST in New Zealand, and the case for the 
introduction of reduced rates to address distributional concerns. The analysis is based on a consumption tax 
micro-simulation model constructed using expenditure micro-data from the Household Economic Survey 
for 2012/13. The distributional effects of excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol and petrol are also considered. 
The paper finds that the lifetime distributional impact of the GST is either proportional or at worst slightly 
regressive. Excise taxes are also found to be roughly proportional or slightly regressive, though they are of 
far smaller magnitude than GST burdens. Simulation results show that the introduction of a European-style 
multi-rate GST system would have a progressive impact on overall GST burdens, but that such a reform 
would benefit richer households significantly more than poorer households in dollar terms. Given it is the 
overall progressivity of the tax system that matters, New Zealand’s current approach of providing targeted 
support to poorer households via the Working for Families tax credit package can be seen as a far more 
cost effective way of supporting poorer households than the introduction of reduced GST rates for specific 
expenditure items. 
 
Keywords: GST, VAT, excise taxes, consumption taxes, distributional effects  
JEL Codes: H23, H24. 
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THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN NEW ZEALAND 
Alastair Thomas
1
 
 
1. Introduction
2
 
The New Zealand goods and services tax (GST) has long been held out by academics and 
policymakers as an example of best practise design of a value added tax system (see, for example, 
Cnossen, 2002). Its broad base and single rate structure minimises compliance and administrative costs, 
avoids distortions to consumption decisions, and at the same time raises significant revenue. Nevertheless, 
public concern is occasionally raised regarding the perceived regressivity of the GST, with consequent 
calls for the introduction of reduced rates of GST on basic necessities such as food and water supply to 
address these distributional concerns. This paper investigates the distributional effects of the GST, and the 
case for the introduction of reduced rates to address distributional concerns. Additionally, the distributional 
effects of excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol and petrol are considered. The analysis is based on a 
consumption tax micro-simulation model constructed using expenditure micro-data from the Household 
Economic Survey for 2012/13.
3
 
Consistent with recent European studies (see, e.g., IFS, 2011), and with previous work with New 
Zealand data (New Zealand Treasury, 2009), the paper finds that the GST in New Zealand is highly 
regressive when measured as a percentage of current income across the income distribution, but roughly 
proportional when measured as a percentage of expenditure. Reflecting the fact that higher spending 
households spend a greater proportion of their total expenditure on the few items in the New Zealand 
system that are untaxed or exempt, the paper finds the GST to be slightly regressive when measured as a 
proportion of expenditure across the expenditure distribution. The paper argues that expenditure provides a 
better measure of the lifetime distributional impact of a consumption tax, and therefore concludes that the 
lifetime impact of the GST is either proportional or at worst slightly regressive. This suggests that public 
                                                     
1 . OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration and Victoria University of Wellington. This paper has benefited 
from comments and suggestions provided by Matt Benge, Bert Brys, John Creedy, Norman Gemmell, Matthew 
Gilbert and Michelle Harding. Thanks are also due to Mike Cunningham, Russell Hewitt, Marcus Jones, Steve 
Mack, Fiona McCarthy, Mark Merwood and Hemant Passi for assistance with, and confirmation of, tax rate and 
average price information. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the OECD or its member countries. 
2 . This paper presents an extended version of the analysis undertaken for New Zealand as part of the 20-country 
study in OECD/KIPF (2014). 
3 . Access to the data used in this study was provided by Statistics New Zealand under conditions designed to give 
effect to the security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. The results presented in the study 
are the work of the author, not Statistics New Zealand. Particular thanks are due to John Upfold, Fiona Wharton 
and the staff of the Microdata Access Team at Statistics New Zealand for assistance with the Household 
Economic Survey micro-data. 
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concerns regarding a highly regressive GST are unwarranted. Excise taxes are also found to be roughly 
proportional or slightly regressive, though they are of far smaller magnitude than GST burdens. 
Nevertheless, even a proportional GST may cause equity concerns (just as a proportional income tax 
may). For example, food and basic necessities will generally make up a greater proportion of the total 
expenditure of low spending households. As such, a proportional GST is more likely to constrain spending 
on necessities by the poor than by the rich. Such concerns can be addressed by the progressive income tax 
and/or benefit system. An alternative approach is to attempt to introduce some progressivity into the GST 
system through the use of zero or reduced rates, as has been attempted in most European countries. 
To examine the merits of moving to a multi-rate system, the paper simulates the adoption of the UK’s 
value-added tax rate structure on the New Zealand data. Results show that a move to such a European-style 
system with a narrow base (compared to New Zealand’s current base) would have a progressive effect, 
lowering GST burdens proportionately more for poor households than for rich households. However, any 
progressivity gains are shown to come at a high fiscal cost as rich households also gain significantly from 
the reform. 
Looking in more detail at the effects of reduced rates on specific expenditure items shows some 
reduced rates to be worse than others at providing support to the poor. Reduced rates typically introduced 
to support the poor – such as on food, water supply, electricity and heating fuels – would have a 
progressive impact on GST burdens if introduced in New Zealand, providing a proportionately greater 
benefit to poor households than to rich households. However, they would still be a very poorly targeted 
way of providing this support. At best they would provide at least as much benefit in aggregate terms to the 
rich as to the poor, but in general they would provide more – often significantly more – aggregate benefit 
to the rich than the poor. Some reduced rates – such as on natural gas and public transport – would be even 
less effective, providing only a roughly proportional, rather than progressive, impact. Meanwhile, reduced 
rates often introduced for non-distributional reasons, such as books and air travel would provide vastly 
more benefit to the rich, to the extent that they would actually have a regressive impact on GST burdens.  
Given it is the overall progressivity of the tax system that matters, New Zealand’s current approach of 
providing targeted support to poor households via the Working for Families tax credit package can be seen 
as a far more cost effective way of supporting poor households than the introduction of reduced GST rates 
for specific expenditure items.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details the underlying micro-simulation methodology 
adopted in this paper. Section 3 discusses further the relative merits of measuring consumption tax burdens 
relative to current income or expenditure, before basic distributional results are then presented in section 4. 
Sections 5 and 6 present simulation results for a shift towards a multi-rate GST system. Concluding 
comments are provided in section 7. 
2. Methodology 
This section briefly outlines the consumption tax micro-simulation model developed for this paper, 
discussing first the data used, then the calculation of taxes and output of the model, and finally the 
underlying assumptions and limitations of the model. 
Data 
The micro-simulation model uses expenditure micro-data from the most recent (2012/13) New 
Zealand Household Economic Survey (HES) to model consumption taxes. The HES is a sample survey of 
households carried out every three years by Statistics New Zealand. It provides detailed information on 
household consumption expenditure on goods and services, and possession of durables. It also captures 
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various demographic characteristics of households. The sample size of the 2012/13 HES dataset is 3,002 
households. 
Calculation of taxes 
The model simulates GST, as well as ad-quantum excise taxes on alcohol (beer, wine, spirits), tobacco 
(cigarettes, cigars, roll tobacco), and petrol. The model is constructed by matching expenditure from the 
HES data to its corresponding tax rates (GST and excise taxes). A micro-simulation program then 
calculates the amount of GST and excise taxes paid by each household by applying the tax rates to the 
corresponding expenditure amounts. Where excise taxes are levied, these are simulated first so that the 
base for the GST includes the excise tax amounts. 
The model simulates two scenarios: one with the current tax rates (as of 1 January 2013), and one with 
“new” rates enabling estimation of the effect of a tax rate change on the consumption tax burden, both on 
individual households and in aggregate. To obtain aggregate revenue figures, the taxes paid by each 
household are adjusted according to population weights and then aggregated. However, the model 
underestimates the consumption tax revenue actually collected in 2012/13. 
There are four main reasons for this inaccuracy: first, the underlying quality of the micro-data results 
in expenditure often being underestimated (and underestimated to different extents across expenditure 
types). Second, some inaccuracy arises from the imperfect application of GST and excise rates to 
expenditure categories in the HES data (this is discussed in more detail below). Third, fraud is not 
simulated, resulting in some overestimation of revenue. Finally, only consumption taxes paid by 
households are simulated – meaning that GST paid by the public sector, charities and businesses is not 
accounted for. As businesses can be expected to pass on the GST to the final consumer this is generally not 
a problem. However, annual revenue figures may include some GST paid by businesses that has not yet 
been passed on to the consumer (and not yet claimed back by the business) and this GST will not be 
simulated by the model. 
Assumptions and limitations 
The microsimulation modeling and resulting analysis are based on a number of assumptions and have 
several limitations. These are discussed below. 
Tax incidence 
The modelling makes the assumption that GST and excise taxes are borne entirely by the final 
consumer. This is a standard assumption made in most similar studies (see, e.g. IFS, 2011; Leahy, Lyons 
and Tol, 2011; Decoster et al., 2010). However, it should be noted that GST and excises may in some cases 
be less than fully (or even more than fully) passed on to consumers.
4
 
Behavioural responses 
The model assumes there are no behavioural responses when simulating changes in tax rates. An 
implication of this is that, for a GST rate increase (decrease), consumers spend more (less) money post-
reform than pre-reform. For the analysis of the distributional effects of the current system this is not an 
issue. However, by not incorporating behavioural responses, the modelling of large changes in 
consumption tax rates – as in sections five and six – may result in some inaccuracy. The simulation results 
should therefore be considered as indicative of patterns rather than precise values. One alternative to 
                                                     
4 . See IHS (2011) for a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature. 
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assuming no behavioural responses would be to estimate behavioural elasticities based on a demand 
system.
5
 Such an extension, however, is left for future work. 
Income data 
Results based on household expenditure survey income data at low income levels may be misleading 
due to the presence of households with transitorily low income (Bozio et al., 2012; Decoster et al., 2010).
6
 
For example, many self-employed workers may have low income levels at certain stages of their 
businesses’ development, but will continue to have unaltered (high) expenditure. Alternatively, some 
households may be drawing down savings to fund their consumption. In either case it is likely to be 
misleading to consider them “low-income” households for distributional analysis. 
To mitigate this concern, we exclude households from the analysis where: 
 the household reports negative or zero income; and/or 
 the household has an expenditure-to-income ratio of four or greater. 
Durable goods 
Modelling consumer durables poses a problem as these are infrequent purchases and the HES data 
only provides a snapshot of expenditure. For example, a car is likely to be owned for several years before 
being replaced, so it would be relatively arbitrary whether or not a car was purchased in the survey period 
(and therefore was included as expenditure). Ideally, we would want to apportion the cost of durables over 
their useful life in order to reduce any overstatement of expenditure for households that have undertaken 
such purchases during the survey period (or any understatement for households that made such purchases 
outside the survey period). However, this would require accurate information on length of ownership and 
expenditure on durables (both purchased within and outside the survey period), and is therefore not a 
feasible option. 
On the other hand, not modeling durables would underestimate consumption and tax revenue 
significantly. We therefore include consumer durables (with the exception of housing – for which no data 
is available in the HES) in the modeling. Given that the basis of the analysis is the presentation of averages 
across decile groupings, we are effectively making the assumption that, within each decile group, the 
number of households that purchase durables in that period, and the number that do not, will “average out” 
– thereby reflecting approximately the same expenditure for that decile as would be modeled if we were 
able to apportion the expenditure across the useful life of the durable. 
GST exemptions 
In the modeling, GST exemptions are simulated as zero rates. Because some revenue is collected 
through the GST embedded in the price of exempt goods and services (due to the inability to claim input 
tax credits), this assumption may also result in some underestimation of actual GST revenue. Input-output 
table analysis could be used to estimate this embedded tax. However, such an exercise is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
                                                     
5 . Such elasticity estimates were, for example, estimated for New Zealand using 1995-2001 HES data by Creedy 
and Sleeman (2006). 
6 . The reliability of income data is an issue across all income levels. Previous studies (e.g. Decoster et al., 2010) 
suggest that income is generally under-reported to at least some extent in household budget surveys. There is 
also evidence to suggest that income may tend to be under-reported to a greater extent for some income 
sources (e.g. self-employment income) than others (see, for example, Hurst et al., 2014). 
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Excise duties 
Excise duties pose a modelling difficulty as they are based on quantity rather than value (i.e. ad-
quantum rather than ad-valorem). In the absence of quantity data, we use average prices (provided by 
Statistics New Zealand) for each product to estimate quantities from the HES expenditure data in order to 
simulate these taxes.
7
 Expenditure data is available for both on- and off-license expenditure on alcohol so 
that excise taxes on alcohol consumed in restaurants and bars can also be modelled. Separate average price 
figures were obtained for on- and off-license alcohol. 
Assuming both average prices and expenditure information are accurate, aggregate tax figures will 
also be accurate under the above approach. However, some inaccuracy may result at the individual level. 
Specifically, for households that consume products that are more (less) expensive than average we will 
simulate higher (lower) taxes than they actually pay because we will be assuming that they consume higher 
(lower) quantities than they actually do.  
Several additional assumptions are necessary. As alcohol is taxed at different rates depending on 
strength, we assume that all beer has greater than 2.5% alcohol content; all wine has between 9-14% 
alcohol content; and all spirits have greater than 14% alcohol content. Additionally, the tobacco content of 
cigarettes is assumed to be less than 0.8kg per 1,000 cigarettes.
8
 
3. Base of analysis: income vs. expenditure 
A problem immediately encountered when working with expenditure microdata to examine the 
distributional effects of consumption taxes is that the conclusions drawn are strongly driven by whether the 
author chooses to present consumption tax burdens relative to current income or expenditure. For example, 
the often-made conclusion that the GST (or “VAT” as it is referred in European countries) is a regressive 
tax follows from the analysis of GST/VAT burdens measured as a percentage of current income across the 
income distribution. Numerous European country studies (see, e.g. Leahy, Lyons and Tol, 2011; Ruiz and 
Trannoy, 2008; O'Donoghue et al., 2004) adopt this analytical approach, and as a result conclude the 
GST/VAT is a highly regressive tax. In contrast, studies that present GST/VAT burdens as a proportion of 
current expenditure across either the income or expenditure distribution (see, e.g. IFS, 2011; Metcalf, 
1994) find that GST/VAT systems are relatively proportional, or even slightly progressive.
9
 
The key point to note, as has been highlighted by various authors (e.g. IFS, 2011; Creedy, 1998; 
Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994) is that this common regressive result is driven by savings behaviour, not the 
inherent nature of the tax. Consider the broad-based single-rate GST in New Zealand: in the absence of 
savings, we could expect high-income and low-income households to pay relatively similar proportions of 
their income in tax. But the picture changes when households do borrow and save. As is shown in figure 1, 
savings rates tend to increase with income (with low-income households being net borrowers and high-
income households net savers, on average). This means that higher income households will tend to have 
proportionately less of their income subject to GST (in the current period) than lower income households, 
resulting in high-income households paying less GST as a percentage of current income than low-income 
                                                     
7 . Taking the monetary expenditure as a starting point, this is divided by the average price to obtain an estimate 
of the quantity purchased. The ad-quantum rate is then applied to this estimated quantity to estimate the tax 
paid. 
8 . Note that alcohol is also subject to a small levy paid to the Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand. This 
hypothecated levy is not included in the modelling. 
9 . See Warren (2008) for a review of different approaches to examining the distributional effects of consumption 
taxes 
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households. This savings pattern is an OECD-wide trend
10
 – hence the regressive results of income based 
studies. 
Figure 1: Expenditure-to-income: New Zealand (2012-13) 
 
                                            Source: 2012-13 New Zealand Household Economic Survey 
However, analysis based on current income ignores the fact that the income that is saved by 
households in the current period will still be spent, and thereby incur GST in the future
11
, or is being used 
to pay back debt-funded previous expenditure that has already incurred GST. Likewise, part of the current 
year’s GST burden may relate to income that was earned in a previous year, but saved and only consumed 
now, or relate to future earnings that have been borrowed against.
12
 This time inconsistency of income and 
its associated tax burden suggests that current income is not an appropriate base for distributional analysis, 
and that a lifetime analysis is necessary to fully assess the distributional effect of a consumption tax.
13
 
The practical problem faced, and reason why so many studies have focused on current income, is that 
it is an exceptionally difficult task to estimate either lifetime tax burdens or lifetime income.
14
 The 
appropriate question then is whether current income or current expenditure is the best available proxy for 
lifetime income. 
The choice between current income and current expenditure is actually a slightly more complicated 
issue, because, as IFS (2011) point out, we need to consider it in two contexts: first, we need to rank 
households from lifetime poor to lifetime rich; and second, we need to measure the relative magnitude of 
the tax faced by each household. 
                                                     
10 . See OECD/KIPF (2014). 
11 . In NPV terms, the future GST will be equivalent to the GST on immediate consumption, assuming tax rates 
and bases stay the same over time, and savings are not taxed. If savings are taxed, income saved may incur 
higher taxation than income immediately spent. Expenditure patterns may also change over time and, if this 
involved a shift towards less or more heavily taxed goods, then this would also alter the NPV of the future 
GST payments. 
12 . Income could also be received or given in the form of a bequest, which when spent will also incur GST. In a 
lifetime context, we would include bequests received in the lifetime resources of the recipient, and 
correspondingly exclude bequests given from the lifetime resources of the giver. 
13 . Ideally we would present lifetime consumption tax burdens, measured as a percentage of lifetime income, 
across lifetime income deciles. 
14 . Though not impossible, see, for example, Fullerton and Rogers (1993) who estimate lifetime tax burdens and 
incomes. Caspersen and Metcalf (1994) estimate lifetime income and compare this with simulated VAT based 
on current expenditure data.  
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Income vs. expenditure distribution 
With regard to ranking households from poor to rich, there is an arguable case for measuring tax 
burdens across both the income and expenditure distributions. For households that are not saving or 
borrowing, either measure is likely to be a reasonable proxy for lifetime income, and hence a reasonable 
means of ranking households. However, for households that borrow or save, income will be a better 
estimate of lifetime income for some households and expenditure a better estimate for other households. 
To see this, consider four stylised households engaging in borrowing/savings: 
 Life-time rich, low current income, high current expenditure: while many low- (current) 
income households will be lifetime poor households, some (e.g. students, self-employed, 
retirees drawing down savings) will actually have much higher lifetime incomes. These 
households may be spending more than they currently earn and paying higher GST as a result. 
Such households are not likely to pose as large a distributional concern to governments as the 
lifetime poor, yet ranking by current income will do so. Current expenditure will therefore be 
a better ranking method. 
 Life-time rich, high current income, low current expenditure: for households with middle and 
higher lifetime income levels that are currently saving a significant portion of their income 
(e.g. for retirement, or for their children’s education), ranking them by their expenditure will 
imply they are less well off than they in fact are. Current income in this case will be a better 
ranking method. 
 Life-time poor, low current income, high current expenditure: some lower income households 
may be living beyond their long-term means. However, such high expenditure will not be 
sustainable, and they will eventually have to reduce their expenditure to pay back the debt 
they are currently incurring. Ranking them by their expenditure will consequently 
overestimate their lifetime living standard. Current income will therefore be a better ranking 
method.  
 Life-time poor, high current income, low current expenditure: some households may 
temporarily be earning above their lifetime income level and be saving in expectation of a 
future fall in income (e.g. with the expectation of one partner leaving the workforce to care for 
children). Ranking by current income will therefore overestimate their long term living 
standard. Expenditure will be a better ranking method. 
Given the ambiguity illustrated above as to the best means of ranking different households, we adopt 
the approach taken by IFS (2011) and present results across both income and expenditure distributions in 
the subsequent sections of this paper. 
Income vs. expenditure base 
With regard to the appropriate base for determining the relative magnitude of the tax, the case for 
preferring expenditure is clearer. Indeed, even when current income is a better proxy for lifetime income, it 
will still be better to use expenditure as the base of the tax calculation. Consider, again, the same four 
stylised borrowing/saving households as above:   
 Life-time rich, low current income, high current expenditure: measuring the tax burden on 
transitorily low-income households relative to current (low) income will overestimate the 
magnitude of the tax burden relative to their higher lifetime income. Instead higher current 
expenditure will be a better base for assessing the lifetime impact of the tax on this household. 
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 Life-time rich, high current income, low current expenditure: in contrast, measuring the tax 
burden on middle and higher income savers relative to current income will underestimate the 
magnitude of the tax burden relative to their lifetime income – even though income remains a 
better estimate of their lifetime income. This is because the reduced level of current 
expenditure also reduces the amount of tax currently paid. Measuring the temporarily lower 
GST burden relative to temporarily lower expenditure will better reflect the lifetime impact of 
the tax on the household. 
For example, consider a household with annualised lifetime income of NZD 100,000 that is 
currently saving for retirement and only spending NZD 50,000 per year. If we assume a GST 
rate of 10%, they will pay GST of NZD 5,000 this year. GST measured as a percentage of 
current income is 5%, while GST as a percentage of expenditure is 10%. It is the 10% figure 
that better reflects the long-run magnitude of the GST burden on this household. That is, over 
their lifetime they will earn, on average, NZD 100,000 per year, and will pay 10% – not 5% – 
of this in GST. 
 Life-time poor, low current income, high current expenditure: measuring the tax burden 
relative to current (low) income will overestimate the magnitude of the tax burden relative to 
their (low) lifetime income – even though, as above, current income remains a better proxy for 
lifetime income. This is because they will eventually have to reduce their expenditure to pay 
back the debt they are currently incurring, thereby reducing their long term GST burden also. 
Measuring the temporarily higher GST burden against temporarily higher expenditure will 
better reflect the lifetime impact of the tax on the household. 
 Life-time poor, high current income, low current expenditure: again, measuring the tax burden 
on transitorily high-income households relative to current (high) income will underestimate 
the magnitude of the tax burden relative to their lower lifetime income. Instead, lower current 
expenditure will be a better base for assessing the lifetime impact of the tax on this household. 
It should be borne in mind that there are still potential rationales for using income as the base: most 
obviously, it is the base against which income taxes are assessed and therefore enables the aggregation of 
income and consumption taxes in distributional analysis.
15
 Nevertheless, while we present overall tax 
burden results as a percentage of both income and expenditure, in our view, the arguments for using 
expenditure as the base are stronger, and this will be the main focus of the analysis and conclusions drawn 
in this paper. 
As already noted, papers analysing GST/VAT as a proportion of expenditure unsurprisingly show 
countries GST/VAT systems to be roughly proportional or even slightly progressive, depending on the 
country. However, this does not necessarily mean they are fair. Assuming diminishing utility of 
consumption, a proportional tax will still have a greater negative impact on the welfare of the poor than of 
the rich.
16
 At the extreme, it may reduce the consumption of necessities by the poor, but just reduce the 
consumption of luxuries by the rich. A proportional tax may also have a greater welfare cost on credit 
constrained households than on those with full access to finance. However, these are not reasons to 
consider a consumption tax regressive. Rather, they are reasons to consider increasing the progressivity of 
the tax/benefit system as a whole (whether that progressivity is introduced through consumption taxes, 
                                                     
15 . And, of course, it is the distributional effect of the tax (and benefit) system as a whole that we should be most 
concerned with. However, again, such an aggregation of effective rates could lead to misleading conclusions 
regarding the long run distributional effects of the tax system as a whole. 
16 . Creedy and Sleeman (2006) examine the welfare effects of consumption taxation in New Zealand. Ball, 
Creedy and Ryan (2014) examine the welfare effects of zero-rating food in New Zealand.  
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income taxes, or the benefit system). The ability of the GST to provide such progressivity is the focus of 
sections 5 and 6 of this paper. 
4. Distributional impact of the current system 
This section presents basic distributional results from the microsimulation model. The overall 
distributional picture is first presented, with average household
17
 GST, excise tax, and total consumption 
tax burdens reported separately across both income and expenditure distributions, before results across 
various demographic factors are presented. While a graphical exposition of the results is favoured below, 
the results are also presented in tabular form in Annex A. 
GST 
Figure 2 presents the basic results for GST. The left hand panel presents the average GST burden 
borne by households as a percentage of disposable income and as a percentage of pre-tax expenditure, 
respectively, across equivalised disposable income deciles.
18
 The right hand panel presents the same results 
across equivalised pre-tax expenditure deciles.  
Figure 2: Average GST burdens per household 
  
Looking first across equivalised income deciles, the GST – as expected – looks highly regressive 
when the base is income, and roughly proportional when expenditure is the base. As noted earlier, these 
two results are consistent with other studies, with the difference between the two results being driven by 
savings behavior. 
The story changes when looking across the expenditure distribution. As a percentage of income, the 
GST now looks progressive. However, this result is once again driven by the misleading effect of savings 
behaviour: at low expenditure levels, households tend to be net savers, so GST as a percentage of income 
appears relatively low. Meanwhile, because high expenditure households tend to be net borrowers, GST as 
                                                     
17 . The unit of analysis is the household, not the individual. While there is the same number of households in each 
decile, the total number of individuals will differ across deciles. 
18 . Equivalisation – to take account of differing levels of need – is based on the OECD-modified scale. This scale 
gives a weighting of 1 to the first adult household member, 0.5 to the second and additional household 
members aged 14 and over, and 0.3 to each child under 14. Gross income or pre-tax expenditure is divided by 
the total household weight to determine the household’s “equivalised” income or expenditure. Alternative 
scales adjusting for both need and economies of scale may affect results in a not insignificant way. Sensitivity 
of results to differing equivalisation measures is left for future work. 
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a percentage of income appears relatively high. In contrast, when measured as a percentage of expenditure 
– which excludes the influence of borrowing and saving – the GST appears slightly regressive.  
Focusing on the expenditure-base results, we can conclude that the GST in New Zealand is either 
roughly proportional or slightly regressive. Given the broad base and single rate structure of the GST, it is 
no surprise that it would look close to proportional across the income distribution. However, the slight 
regressivity of the GST across the expenditure distribution does provide the interesting insight that higher 
spending households spend a greater proportion of their total expenditure than lower spending households 
on items that are either untaxed or exempt from tax (for example, financial services, and international air 
transport). 
It should, however, be borne in mind that there will be some GST embedded in the production chain 
of exempted goods that is not captured in the modelling, but – to the extent that it is passed on into 
consumer prices – will be borne by workers. And this is likely to reduce the degree of regressivity shown 
in Figure 2. Nevertheless it still appears reasonable to conclude that the GST in New Zealand is roughly 
proportional or just slightly regressive. 
This result contrasts slightly with available results for most other countries, which tend to find the 
GST/VAT to be either proportional or slightly progressive when measured as a percentage of expenditure. 
However, such results are driven by the presence of reduced rates on expenditure items consumed in 
greater proportions by lower spending households (see, e.g., OECD/KIPF, 2014; IFS, 2011). 
Excise taxes 
Figure 3 presents the basic results for excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco and transport fuels.
19
 In 
comparison to GST, the magnitudes are far lower, reflecting the lower levels of expenditure on goods 
subject to excise taxes. Results are more consistent across all four measures showing a roughly 
proportional or slightly regressive pattern. 
Figure 3: Average excise tax burdens per household 
  
The results when measured as a percentage of income across income deciles appear more regressive 
than when measured as a percentage of expenditure. Equally, results measured as a percentage of income 
across expenditure deciles are less regressive (they appear roughly proportional in fact) than when 
measured as a percentage of expenditure. This implies that some of the influence of savings behaviour on 
                                                     
19 . As diesel vehicles are taxed under a road user charge system rather than through excise taxation, the resulting 
tax burden is not captured in the modelling. 
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GST burdens is also reflected in excise tax burdens, though to a lesser extent given the less direct 
relationship between total expenditure and excise tax burdens as compared to GST burdens. 
Irrespective of any distorting effect due to savings behaviour, it is perhaps slightly surprising that the 
results are not more regressive, particularly given the addictive nature of alcohol and tobacco (suggesting a 
similar quantity will be consumed irrespective of income/total expenditure). Part of the explanation may 
relate to the influence of transport fuels on the overall results – with poorer households being less likely to 
own, let alone drive, a car.
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Total consumption taxes  
Figure 4 presents the combined results for both GST and excise taxes. Given the lower magnitude of 
excise taxes than GST, they have only a relatively small impact on the overall trends for consumption 
taxes, which as a whole still largely exhibit the trends of the GST. That said, the slight regressive trend as a 
proportion of expenditure across expenditure deciles has clearly increased with the combined effects of 
both GST and excise taxes. However, in comparison to the strongly regressive picture presented as a 
percentage of income across income deciles, the expenditure-based regressive pattern is still relatively 
small. Meanwhile, across income deciles, the expenditure-based pattern remains roughly proportional.  
Overall, therefore, we can conclude that the total consumption tax burden is either roughly proportional or 
at worst exhibits a small degree of regressivity. 
Figure 4: Average total consumption tax burdens per household 
  
Demographics 
Figure 5 presents the household average tax burden results across household type, as a percentage of 
gross income (left panel) and as a percentage of pre-tax expenditure (right panel). For both income and 
expenditure bases, average tax burdens tend to be highest for households without children. Average tax 
burdens are lowest meanwhile for single parent households, particularly when measured as a percentage of 
expenditure. One possibility for this lower relative tax burden when measured as a percentage of 
expenditure rather than income is that such generally low-income households may borrow to pay a large 
proportion of their expenditure (but smaller proportion of their income) on untaxed expenditure items such 
as rental accommodation. 
                                                     
20 . Future work will examine in more detail the distributional effects of excise taxes on energy products in New 
Zealand. See Flues and Thomas (2015) for an examination of the distributional effects of excise taxes on 
energy products in 21 OECD countries. 
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Figure 5: Average total consumption tax burdens by household type 
  
Figure 6 now presents household average tax burdens across age groups. Across both income and 
expenditure bases, average tax burdens increase with age (with the slight exception of the two youngest 
age groups on the left hand panel). As pointed out by New Zealand Treasury (2009), this result is likely 
due to untaxed housing expenses constituting a falling proportion of income (and expenditure) as age 
increases.
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Figure 6: Average total consumption tax burdens by age of household head 
  
Finally, figure 7 compares household average tax burdens for smokers and non-smokers. 
Unsurprisingly, smokers face significantly higher tax burdens, irrespective of base, due to the higher excise 
tax burdens they face. 
Figure 7: Average total consumption tax burdens for smokers and non-smokers 
  
5. A multi-rate GST in New Zealand? 
To consider the distributional effects of adopting a multi-rate GST system in New Zealand, we 
simulate the adoption of the UK’s VAT rate structure. The UK provides a useful example of the VAT 
structure of a typical European country with a large number of reduced rates and exemptions. The standard 
                                                     
21 . Housing is not actually untaxed as GST is imposed on the sale of newly constructed housing, and this cost can 
be expected to be capitalised into rental prices. However, this price effect is not captured in the modelling. 
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VAT rate in the UK is 20% (as of 1 January 2013). A zero rate of VAT applies to most food products 
(excluding chocolate, confectionary, ice cream, some cakes and biscuits, snack foods, soft drinks, mineral 
water, fruit and vegetable juices, energy drinks, restaurant food, and ready-to-eat meals), children’s 
clothing and footwear, the purchase of housing, water supply, pharmaceutical products, domestic and 
international passenger transport, books, newspapers and magazines. A 5% rate applies to electricity, gas 
for heating, solid and liquid fuels for heating, and insulation for housing. Meanwhile, rental of residential 
property, educational expenses, most medical and dental expenses, postal services, financial services, life 
insurance, and admission to certain cultural events are exempt. 
The underlying assumption made in this simulation is that the introduction of the UK rate structure in 
New Zealand would not result in any alteration in households’ consumption bundles (i.e. no behavioural 
response). This is of course a simplification, and there would still likely be some behavioural response to 
the removal of reduced rates (away from higher taxed and towards lower taxed items). The simulation 
results should therefore be considered as indicative of patterns rather than precise values. 
Figure 9 (and Annex B) presents the results of the simulated reform and compares this with the 
current rate structure (from Figure 2). Average household GST burdens are presented as a percentage of 
pre-tax expenditure across equivalised household disposable income deciles (left panel) and equivalised 
household pre-tax expenditure deciles (right panel). In addition, Figure 9 also presents the percentage 
reduction in the GST burden across both income and expenditure deciles (measured on the right hand axis). 
Figure 9: Average GST burdens per household: pre- and post-reform 
  
Despite the higher standard rate, we see that the move to the UK rate structure results in a large 
reduction in the tax burden across the board. This emphasises the narrowness of the UK VAT base in 
comparison to New Zealand’s GST base. However, we do see a progressive effect from the reform – with 
the GST reduction for low income/expenditure households being significantly greater than that for high 
income/expenditure households. Across income deciles, the GST has moved from being roughly 
proportional to slightly progressive, while across expenditure deciles the previously slightly regressive 
GST now also appears slightly progressive.  
These results are, of course, unsurprising as low income/expenditure households can be expected to 
consume a greater proportion of their total expenditure on reduced and zero-rate goods than higher 
income/expenditure households. This after all is the reason why many of these reduced rates are present in 
the UK in the first place. The increase in the standard rate adds to this overall effect as these goods 
correspondingly form a greater proportion of higher income/expenditure household’s total expenditure.  
While the switch to the UK’s multi-rate system clearly does have a progressive effect, it comes at 
some cost: total simulated GST revenue falls by 22% from NZD 9,441 million to NZD 7,319 million. As 
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Figure 9 has shown, this revenue loss comes from GST reductions for both the poor and the rich, which 
highlights one of the main criticisms of multi-rate systems: that they are a blunt instrument with which to 
target the poor. The next section examines this issue in more detail. 
6. Who gains from reduced rates? 
In this section we look at who would benefit from the introduction of the reduced rates simulated in 
the previous section, and how this would vary depending on the particular expenditure item. We do this by 
calculating the “tax expenditure” (i.e. the reduction in tax paid) related to different goods and services 
subject to reduced rates. For each expenditure item, the tax expenditure is calculated as the monetary 
difference between the actual GST collected from each household (at the 15% rate) and the simulated GST 
revenue at the reduced (5% or zero) rate under the UK’s structure. Effectively, the standard 15% GST rate 
is being used as the benchmark against which to calculate the size of the tax expenditure. 
Once again, the underlying assumption behind the analysis is that the introduction of the reduced rates 
induces no alteration in households’ consumption bundles (i.e. no behavioural response). As in reality there 
would still likely be some behavioural response to the introduction of reduced rates, the results presented 
below are likely to underestimate to some extent the size of the actual tax expenditure.
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We first consider the overall effect of all reduced GST rates, before then considering reduced rates on 
specific consumption items grouped broadly by policy intent. The first group covers reduced rates that are 
most likely introduced to provide support to poor households: food, pharmaceutical products, and 
children’s clothing and shoes. We then consider reduced rates for utilities and energy products, which may 
also be introduced to support the poor. Finally, we consider reduced rates that are more likely to be 
introduced for non-distributional purposes, such as supporting cultural activities and perceived social 
goods. While once again a graphical exposition of the results is favoured below, the results are also 
presented in tabular form in Annex C. 
All reduced rates 
Figure 10 summarises the tax expenditure results for all reduced GST rates: solid bars present the 
average tax expenditure per household across income deciles (left hand panel) and expenditure deciles 
(right hand panel). The dotted lines present the same results as a percentage of household expenditure. 
Considering first the aggregate tax expenditure results, Figure 10 shows a clear pattern with higher 
income/expenditure deciles benefiting from successively larger tax expenditures. The tax reduction for 
households in the top income decile is a touch over NZD 3 000 compared to just under NZD 1 200 for the 
bottom decile. Across expenditure deciles the result is even more extreme: the top decile receives just over 
NZD 3 300, which is close to four times the tax expenditure received by the bottom decile. 
While these differences are large, looking at their size relative to household expenditure nevertheless 
shows that the poor still gain proportionately more than the rich – consistent with the results presented in 
section 5. This can be seen from the downward sloping dotted lines in Figure 10. 
 
                                                     
22. While we have also simulated a number of exemptions in the multi-rate reform, we do not present results for 
the tax expenditures associated with these expenditure items. This is due to the added complexity associated 
with the likely presence of some tax that has been embedded in the production chain (due to the inability to 
claim input tax credits for exempt goods). As we model these exemptions as zero-rates, the modelling will 
underestimate the amount of tax collected from these expenditure items post reform, thereby overstating any 
estimate of the tax reduction from the exemption. 
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Figure 10: Average tax expenditure per household from all reduced rates 
   
Reduced rates typically aimed at supporting the poor 
 Figures 11 and 12 examine the targeting of the simulated zero rate on food products. Figure 11 
presents the tax expenditure results for all food subject to the zero rate, while figure 12 presents results for 
a subset of this – fresh fruit and vegetables.  
Figure 11: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rates on all food 
   
Figure 12: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on fresh food and vegetables 
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 The patterns shown in both Figures 11 and 12 are very similar, with richer households (whether 
measured by income or expenditure) again receiving a significantly greater aggregate tax reduction than 
poorer households – though the difference is not as marked as was the case for all reduced rates. As before, 
the difference tends to be greater across expenditure deciles than across income deciles. For all food 
subject to the zero rate, the tax reduction for households in the top income decile is almost NZD 1 200 
compared to just over NZD 700 for the bottom decile. Meanwhile, the top expenditure decile receives over 
NZD 1 400 compared to approximately NZD 470 received by the bottom decile. Looking at the relative 
size of the tax expenditures we see that the poor gain considerably more than the rich as a proportion of 
expenditure. 
Despite their policy intent, the significant tax expenditures provided across the entire 
income/expenditure distributions clearly illustrate that reduced rates for food are not a well targeted way of 
supporting poor households. Nevertheless, they do still have a progressive impact on overall GST burdens. 
And despite being poorly targeted, they do provide a significant level of support to poor households, 
highlighting why reduced rates for food are a key part of multi-rate GST/VAT systems in many countries. 
Indeed, a comparison with figure 10 shows that the reduced rate on food would provide more than half of 
the total support to poor households from all reduced GST rates. 
A similar increasing pattern emerges in the aggregate tax expenditure results for the zero rate on 
pharmaceutical products (figure 13). While the aggregate amounts are less than for food, they are still 
significant with top decile households benefiting from a tax reduction of around NZD 85 (income deciles) 
to NZD 95 (expenditure deciles). These amounts are, respectively, around three-and-a-half times the 
reduction gained by the bottom income decile, and more than seven times the reduction gained by the 
bottom expenditure decile. As a proportion of expenditure, the reduced rates on pharmaceuticals still tend 
to benefit lower rather than higher income/expenditure households. However, it is households in the 
second and third income/expenditure deciles that tend to benefit the most, with bottom decile households 
benefiting only to a similar degree as higher income/expenditure households. 
Figure 13: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on pharmaceuticals 
   
 Figure 14 presents the average household tax reduction from the zero rate on children’s clothing and 
shoes. Across income deciles, a slightly mixed pattern emerges with both the aggregate and proportionate 
tax reductions varying across the income distribution – although the bottom two deciles still benefit the 
least in aggregate terms. When measured across expenditure deciles the same increasing pattern as before 
emerges – with the rich benefiting significantly more than the poor. As a proportion of expenditure, 
households in the upper middle of the expenditure distribution tend to benefit the most, with the top two 
deciles benefiting to a far smaller degree – though still by more than the bottom two deciles. 
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Figure 14: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on children’s clothing and shoes 
   
Reduced rates on public utilities and energy 
Reduced rates and/or exemptions on what, at least historically, were public utilities are common 
across European GST/VAT systems, and are indeed present in the UK system. In the UK, this includes 
zero rates on water supply and public transport, and reduced rates on energy products. While the rationale 
for these concessions may not originally have been specifically to support the poor, this is often their 
predominant purpose in countries now. 
Figure 15 presents the average household tax reduction from the zero rate on water supply. Compared 
to the previous expenditure categories, the distribution of the aggregate tax reduction for water supply is 
flatter across both income and expenditure deciles. Nevertheless, top decile households still receive around 
twice the tax reduction that bottom decile households receive. As a percentage of expenditure, water 
supply shows a similar progressive pattern, with poorer households benefiting more than richer 
households.  
Figure 15: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on water supply 
   
Figures 16-18 present tax reductions for energy products – electricity, (solid and liquid) heating fuels, 
and natural gas which are subject to the reduced rate of 5% under the shift to the UK’s rate structure. 
Results vary across the three categories. Electricity and heating fuels show relatively similar aggregate tax 
expenditures across both income and expenditure distributions. Unsurprisingly, this leads to poor 
households benefiting considerably more than rich households as a proportion of expenditure. In contrast, 
aggregate tax expenditures exhibit a strongly increasing pattern for natural gas. Nevertheless, rich and poor 
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households still tend to benefit to relatively similar degrees across the income distribution, while poor 
households tend to benefit to a slightly greater degree than the rich across the expenditure distribution. 
The magnitudes of the tax reductions from the reduced rate on electricity are far greater than for the 
other energy products (with only the zero rate for food providing greater tax reductions across the board). 
This illustrates New Zealand households’ strong dependence on electricity for domestic heating and 
cooking purposes as compared to natural gas and heating fuels. 
Figure 16: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on electricity 
   
Figure 17: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on solid and liquid heating fuels 
   
Figure 18: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on natural gas 
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 Similar to natural gas, the zero rate on road and rail public transport (Figure 19) provides significantly 
greater aggregate tax reductions to rich households over poor households, but roughly proportional tax 
reductions as a percentage of expenditure (though with considerable variability). 
Figure 19: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on road and rail transport 
   
Reduced rates introduced for cultural, social and other non-distributional purposes 
As well as specifically targeting the poor with the above zero and reduced rates, the UK also provides 
reduced rates for books, newspapers and magazines – arguably on the basis that increased consumption of 
these goods has broader social benefits. Additionally, domestic and international air transport are zero 
rated. The reduced rate for international air transport is part of a worldwide response to the difficulty of 
assigning taxation rights to a service that may occur across multiple countries. While international air 
transport is also zero rated in New Zealand (and hence does not affect the overall reform results), we 
present the tax expenditure results to illustrate the distribution of the tax reduction from this zero rate 
already present in the current New Zealand system. 
Figures 20 and 21 present the average household tax expenditures from the zero rates on books, and 
on newspapers and magazines, respectively. For books, the zero rate strongly favours richer households, 
not just in aggregate terms but also as a proportion of expenditure (though not monotonically). This 
regressive effect is in strong contrast to the reduced rates on the previously presented expenditure items 
which had either a progressive or roughly proportional effect on the overall tax burden. The regressive 
impact is particularly strong when examined across expenditure deciles where bottom decile households 
receive almost no benefit at all from the zero rate – as they spend almost no money on books. Interestingly, 
across income deciles it is the seventh decile that receives the greatest aggregate and proportional benefit 
from the reduced rate rather than the top decile, while the third expenditure decile also benefits 
disproportionately relative to the overall regressive pattern. 
Turning to newspapers and magazines, we see instead that the aggregate tax reduction is spread far 
more evenly across both income and expenditure distributions than for books. While richer households still 
tend to benefit more than poorer households in aggregate terms, they now benefit by less in proportionate 
terms. 
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Figure 20: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on books 
   
Figure 21: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on newspapers and magazines 
   
Finally, the zero rates on domestic and international air transport (Figures 22 and 23) can be seen to 
benefit the rich vastly more than the poor in aggregate terms, leading to similarly larger tax reductions for 
the rich in proportionate terms. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the reductions gained by rich households 
are very substantive. For international air travel they correspond roughly with the amount gained by rich 
households from the reduced rate on fresh fruit and vegetables – but in this case the poor receive very little 
benefit at all. This result is not unexpected given that poor households are less likely to undertake 
international travel. Surprisingly, the average benefit gained by the top earning households is greater than 
that gained by the top spending households for international air travel. This contrasts with the results for 
other expenditure items, and suggests that international travel is less likely to be funded by borrowing than 
other expenditure. 
Overall, the results in this section clearly show that reduced GST rates are an extremely inefficient 
way of targeting support to poor households. At best, rich households gain similar amounts to the poor. At 
worst, rich households gain vastly more. Furthermore in some cases, rich households benefit by so much 
more than poor households that they even benefit more when measured as a proportion of their 
expenditure. That is, not only are reduced GST rates poorly targeted at the poor, in some cases they can 
actually be regressive. 
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Figure 22: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on domestic air transport 
   
Figure 23: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on international air transport 
   
7. Concluding comments 
This paper has examined the distributional effects of consumption taxes in New Zealand using a 
microsimulation model based on 2012-13 household expenditure data. Consistent with recent European 
studies, and with previous work with New Zealand data, we find that the GST in New Zealand is highly 
regressive when measured as a percentage of current income across the income distribution, but roughly 
proportional when measured as a percentage of expenditure. Reflecting the fact that higher spending 
households spend a greater proportion of their total expenditure on the few items in the New Zealand 
system that are untaxed or exempt, we find the GST to be slightly regressive when measured as a 
proportion of expenditure across the expenditure distribution.  
The paper argues that expenditure provides a better measure of the lifetime distributional effect of a 
consumption tax, and therefore concludes that the lifetime impact of the GST is either proportional or at 
worst slightly regressive – suggesting that public concerns regarding a highly regressive GST are 
unwarranted. Excise taxes are also found to be slightly regressive, though they are of far smaller magnitude 
than GST burdens.  
The paper also examines the merits of a move to a multi-rate GST system by simulating the UK’s 
VAT rate structure on the New Zealand data. Results show that a move to such a European-style system 
with a narrow base (compared to New Zealand’s current base) would have a progressive effect, lowering 
GST burdens proportionately more for poor households than for rich households. However, any 
progressivity gains are shown to come at a high fiscal cost as not only do rich households also gain from 
0.00%
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.04%
0.05%
0.06%
0.07%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
NZD Aggregate % of expenditure
0.00%
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.04%
0.05%
0.06%
0.07%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
NZD
Expenditure deciles
Aggregate % of expenditure
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.25%
0.30%
0.35%
0.40%
0.45%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
NZD Aggregate % of expenditure
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.25%
0.30%
0.35%
0.40%
0.45%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
NZD
Expenditure deciles
Aggregate % of expenditure
 23 
the reform, but they gain substantially more than the poor in aggregate terms. In other words, reduced GST 
rates are shown to be a highly inefficient way of targeting support to poor households. Furthermore, the 
introduction of reduced GST rates would significantly increase the compliance and administrative costs 
associated with the tax. 
Looking in more detail at the effects of reduced rates on specific expenditure items shows some 
reduced rates to be worse than others at providing support to the poor. Reduced rates typically introduced 
to support the poor – such as on food, water supply, electricity and heating fuels – would have a 
progressive impact on GST burdens if introduced in New Zealand, providing a proportionately greater 
benefit to poor households than to rich households. However, they would still be a very poorly targeted 
way of providing this support. At best they would provide at least as much benefit in aggregate terms to the 
rich as to the poor, but in general they would provide more – often significantly more – aggregate benefit 
to the rich than the poor. Some reduced rates – such as on natural gas and public transport – would be even 
less effective, providing only a roughly proportional, rather than progressive, impact. Meanwhile, reduced 
rates often introduced for non-distributional reasons, such as books and air travel would provide vastly 
more benefit to the rich, to the extent that they would actually have a regressive impact on GST burdens. 
Given it is the overall progressivity of the tax system that matters, New Zealand’s current approach of 
providing targeted support to poor households via the Working for Families (WFF) tax credit package can 
be seen as a far more cost effective way of supporting poor households than the introduction of reduced 
GST rates for specific expenditure items. Not only does the income-tested nature of the WFF package 
ensure better targeting of support to poorer households, it ensures a fairer distribution of support amongst 
those households based on income and family type, rather than based on potentially arbitrary consumption 
patterns. 
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ANNEX A 
GST AND EXCISE BURDEN RESULTS 
Table A1: Average GST burdens as a percentage of disposable income and pre-tax expenditure: income deciles 
(LHS); expenditure deciles (RHS). 
                
Table A2: Average excise tax burdens as a percentage of disposable income and pre-tax expenditure: income deciles 
(LHS); expenditure deciles (RHS). 
                
Table A3: Average total consumption tax burdens as a percentage of disposable income and pre-tax expenditure 
across household type 
 
Poorest 11.5% 10.7%
2 10.5% 11.9%
3 10.3% 11.0%
4 9.2% 11.1%
5 9.6% 11.1%
6 9.2% 11.5%
7 8.1% 11.4%
8 7.6% 11.2%
9 7.3% 11.0%
Richest 5.9% 11.4%
GST / 
income
GST / 
expenditure
Poorest 6.0% 12.1%
2 8.0% 11.7%
3 8.5% 11.5%
4 8.7% 10.7%
5 9.4% 11.4%
6 9.4% 11.5%
7 9.4% 11.2%
8 9.0% 10.6%
9 10.1% 10.8%
Richest 10.9% 10.7%
GST / 
income
GST / 
expenditure
Poorest 2.7% 2.6%
2 1.8% 2.1%
3 2.1% 2.4%
4 2.2% 2.8%
5 1.9% 2.4%
6 1.7% 2.3%
7 1.6% 2.4%
8 1.6% 2.5%
9 1.3% 2.1%
Richest 0.9% 1.8%
Excise / 
income
Excise / 
expenditure
Poorest 1.5% 2.8%
2 2.0% 2.9%
3 2.0% 2.7%
4 2.0% 2.6%
5 1.9% 2.4%
6 1.9% 2.4%
7 1.9% 2.4%
8 1.7% 2.0%
9 1.6% 1.7%
Richest 1.5% 1.5%
Excise / 
income
Excise / 
expenditure
1adult 11.2% 14.1%
2adults 11.0% 14.2%
>2adults 10.1% 14.3%
1adult+ch 9.4% 10.6%
2adults+ch 10.7% 12.9%
>2adults+ch 10.1% 13.4%
Tax / 
income
Tax / 
expenditure
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Table A4: Average total consumption tax burdens as a percentage of disposable income and pre-tax expenditure 
across age (of household head). 
 
Table A5: Average total consumption tax burdens as a percentage of disposable income and pre-tax expenditure for 
smokers vs non-smokers. 
 
ANNEX B 
UK RATE STRUCTURE REFORM RESULTS 
Table B1: Average GST burdens under the UK VAT rate structure as a percentage of pre-tax expenditure: income 
deciles (LHS); expenditure deciles (RHS). 
                
 
20-29 10.0% 11.5%
30-39 9.7% 11.7%
40-49 10.2% 13.0%
50-59 10.9% 14.5%
60-69 11.8% 14.9%
70+ 11.8% 15.7%
Tax / 
income
Tax / 
expenditure
non-smoker 10.3% 12.8%
smoker 12.8% 16.9%
Tax / 
expenditure
Tax / 
income
Poorest 6.7%
2 7.5%
3 7.8%
4 8.0%
5 8.1%
6 8.5%
7 8.6%
8 8.3%
9 8.4%
Richest 8.8%
UK VAT / 
expenditure
Poorest 7.0%
2 7.6%
3 7.7%
4 7.7%
5 8.4%
6 8.6%
7 8.1%
8 8.1%
9 8.5%
Richest 8.8%
UK VAT / 
expenditure
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ANNEX C 
GST TAX EXPENDITURE RESULTS 
Table C1: Average tax expenditure per household from all reduced rates: income deciles (LHS); expenditure deciles 
(RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                
Table C2: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on all food: income deciles (LHS); expenditure 
deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Table C3: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on fresh fruit and vegetables: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                
 
Poorest 1,175 (4.3)
2 1,165 (4.5)
3 1,422 (4.4)
4 1,527 (3.6)
5 1,744 (3.8)
6 1,926 (3.6)
7 1,948 (3.4)
8 2,182 (3.4)
9 2,412 (3.4)
Richest 3,007 (3.5)
Poorest 854 (5.2)
2 1,083 (4.6)
3 1,341 (4.3)
4 1,431 (3.8)
5 1,722 (3.7)
6 1,815 (3.5)
7 2,091 (3.4)
8 2,204 (3.3)
9 2,666 (3.3)
Richest 3,302 (2.9)
Poorest 722 (2.5)
2 628 (2.3)
3 770 (2.3)
4 865 (2.0)
5 963 (2.0)
6 1,017 (1.8)
7 1,041 (1.8)
8 1,155 (1.7)
9 1,097 (1.5)
Richest 1,181 (1.4)
Poorest 471 (2.6)
2 613 (2.5)
3 767 (2.4)
4 856 (2.2)
5 954 (2.0)
6 983 (1.9)
7 1,057 (1.7)
8 1,071 (1.5)
9 1,217 (1.5)
Richest 1,454 (1.3)
Poorest 130 (0.46)
2 129 (0.48)
3 147 (0.45)
4 156 (0.35)
5 159 (0.36)
6 184 (0.35)
7 190 (0.35)
8 225 (0.33)
9 209 (0.31)
Richest 243 (0.29)
Poorest 82 (0.48)
2 121 (0.50)
3 149 (0.48)
4 154 (0.40)
5 174 (0.37)
6 193 (0.36)
7 207 (0.33)
8 185 (0.27)
9 229 (0.28)
Richest 276 (0.25)
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Table C4: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on pharmaceuticals: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                
Table C5: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on children’s clothing and shoes: income 
deciles (LHS); expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                
Table C6: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on water supply: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Poorest 24 (0.080)
2 42 (0.158)
3 47 (0.166)
4 44 (0.104)
5 53 (0.108)
6 63 (0.110)
7 63 (0.108)
8 58 (0.094)
9 62 (0.088)
Richest 86 (0.103)
Poorest 14 (0.094)
2 36 (0.159)
3 47 (0.156)
4 34 (0.092)
5 59 (0.128)
6 57 (0.116)
7 68 (0.105)
8 57 (0.083)
9 75 (0.094)
Richest 96 (0.094)
Poorest 7 (0.014)
2 8 (0.019)
3 17 (0.036)
4 17 (0.038)
5 18 (0.033)
6 25 (0.040)
7 17 (0.024)
8 30 (0.037)
9 19 (0.027)
Richest 15 (0.016)
Poorest 3 (0.013)
2 4 (0.014)
3 10 (0.025)
4 14 (0.034)
5 18 (0.037)
6 24 (0.043)
7 22 (0.033)
8 34 (0.046)
9 17 (0.019)
Richest 27 (0.019)
Poorest 21 (0.076)
2 18 (0.066)
3 28 (0.084)
4 36 (0.076)
5 29 (0.063)
6 35 (0.069)
7 27 (0.046)
8 33 (0.051)
9 38 (0.056)
Richest 42 (0.053)
Poorest 18 (0.100)
2 21 (0.079)
3 22 (0.065)
4 32 (0.075)
5 30 (0.061)
6 37 (0.073)
7 32 (0.052)
8 32 (0.050)
9 34 (0.040)
Richest 50 (0.045)
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Table C7: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on electricity: income deciles (LHS); expenditure 
deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Table C8: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on solid and liquid heating fuels: income 
deciles (LHS); expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Table C9: Average tax expenditure per household from reduced rate on natural gas: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Poorest 191 (0.78)
2 162 (0.71)
3 191 (0.64)
4 194 (0.50)
5 210 (0.49)
6 209 (0.44)
7 190 (0.39)
8 203 (0.36)
9 207 (0.32)
Richest 229 (0.28)
Poorest 162 (1.01)
2 172 (0.73)
3 187 (0.60)
4 189 (0.53)
5 207 (0.47)
6 197 (0.39)
7 225 (0.38)
8 202 (0.31)
9 209 (0.27)
Richest 236 (0.22)
Poorest 4 (0.013)
2 5 (0.020)
3 5 (0.020)
4 5 (0.013)
5 5 (0.012)
6 7 (0.015)
7 6 (0.010)
8 6 (0.013)
9 8 (0.012)
Richest 3 (0.003)
Poorest 4 (0.023)
2 5 (0.021)
3 4 (0.014)
4 7 (0.018)
5 4 (0.010)
6 7 (0.013)
7 8 (0.015)
8 5 (0.007)
9 6 (0.008)
Richest 4 (0.004)
Poorest 11 (0.048)
2 9 (0.034)
3 13 (0.049)
4 16 (0.036)
5 20 (0.039)
6 19 (0.035)
7 23 (0.036)
8 26 (0.045)
9 31 (0.041)
Richest 46 (0.058)
Poorest 8 (0.058)
2 11 (0.053)
3 11 (0.035)
4 11 (0.028)
5 23 (0.048)
6 19 (0.034)
7 22 (0.038)
8 29 (0.043)
9 40 (0.050)
Richest 40 (0.035)
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Table C10: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on road and rail transport: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Table C11: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on books: income deciles (LHS); expenditure 
deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                
Table C12: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on newspapers and magazines: income deciles 
(LHS); expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Poorest 19 (0.072)
2 19 (0.055)
3 19 (0.051)
4 39 (0.078)
5 27 (0.054)
6 42 (0.068)
7 23 (0.035)
8 52 (0.065)
9 65 (0.083)
Richest 69 (0.078)
Poorest 15 (0.064)
2 14 (0.058)
3 19 (0.052)
4 27 (0.065)
5 27 (0.051)
6 43 (0.082)
7 58 (0.084)
8 40 (0.057)
9 65 (0.070)
Richest 66 (0.056)
Poorest 5 (0.017)
2 8 (0.024)
3 12 (0.035)
4 22 (0.047)
5 20 (0.040)
6 18 (0.036)
7 56 (0.063)
8 26 (0.043)
9 29 (0.035)
Richest 43 (0.044)
Poorest 1 (0.006)
2 8 (0.034)
3 17 (0.058)
4 11 (0.024)
5 17 (0.040)
6 23 (0.042)
7 26 (0.046)
8 24 (0.035)
9 52 (0.053)
Richest 59 (0.045)
Poorest 10 (0.045)
2 19 (0.094)
3 19 (0.070)
4 19 (0.055)
5 26 (0.069)
6 20 (0.047)
7 20 (0.040)
8 21 (0.034)
9 34 (0.048)
Richest 34 (0.041)
Poorest 10 (0.078)
2 14 (0.074)
3 16 (0.068)
4 20 (0.056)
5 21 (0.052)
6 24 (0.055)
7 29 (0.052)
8 19 (0.034)
9 36 (0.043)
Richest 32 (0.031)
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Table C13: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on domestic air transport: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
Table C14: Average tax expenditure per household from zero rate on international air transport: income deciles (LHS); 
expenditure deciles (RHS) 
 (% of expenditure in parentheses) 
                        
 
Poorest 5 (0.008)
2 5 (0.016)
3 4 (0.012)
4 10 (0.019)
5 13 (0.024)
6 33 (0.050)
7 12 (0.020)
8 19 (0.027)
9 47 (0.060)
Richest 63 (0.064)
Poorest 2 (0.011)
2 1 (0.004)
3 4 (0.017)
4 5 (0.015)
5 15 (0.030)
6 13 (0.026)
7 28 (0.045)
8 47 (0.056)
9 27 (0.033)
Richest 66 (0.062)
Poorest 24 (0.07)
2 43 (0.10)
3 48 (0.11)
4 62 (0.12)
5 89 (0.16)
6 85 (0.15)
7 122 (0.20)
8 122 (0.20)
9 222 (0.26)
Richest 386 (0.40)
Poorest 11 (0.07)
2 18 (0.06)
3 33 (0.10)
4 35 (0.09)
5 84 (0.17)
6 84 (0.17)
7 154 (0.25)
8 177 (0.25)
9 266 (0.32)
Richest 340 (0.28)
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